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Abstract
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and advertising are strategic complements. If a
claim about the environmental or social benefits of a product is unsubstantiated or mislead-
ing, this practice is known as greenwashing (GW). The model clearly identifies some “usual
suspects” that will prefer GW over CSR. We then carry out an empirical analysis using
CSR data, economic data on the 500 largest European firms, and proxies for green com-
munication to test the predictions. Several instruments are used to estimate the propensity
to prefer GW. We show that “hard greenwashing”, i.e. active communication with no CSR
at all, is not always a credible strategy, and highlight the concept of “light greenwashing”.
It may have two dimensions: either it can be a response to the presence of greenwashing
firms or it can be due to the simple possibility of advertising. Both possibilities are verified
empirically, thus confirming the changing nature of greenwashing practices.
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1 Introduction
“Seems like anything and everything has “gone green” these days. Airlines, car companies, retail-
ers, restaurants - heck, even networks and stadiums. Thankfully, more often than not, that’s a
good thing. It’s only bad if it’s greenwashing - that’s bad for the environment, consumers, and, ul-
timately, for the very businesses doing the greenwashing - whether they mean to or not.”, said the
promoters of the Greenwashing Index.1 The rise of environmental concerns and the development
of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) have led to a boom in green or social advertising. The
strong emphasis on communication contributes to skepticism in the civil society about the reality
of the social and environmental commitments of firms. “The image of multinational companies
working hard to make the World a better place is often just that - an image”, said a report from
the British NGO ChristianAid (2004). This skepticism may be explained by the greenwashing
phenomenon.
Greenwashing took root in the 1970s concurrently with the emergence of environmental move-
ments. It is defined by Greenpeace as “the act of misleading consumers regarding the environ-
mental2 practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service”.3 A direct
consequence of greenwashing is skepticism towards the ability of Corporate Social Responsibility
to bring effective changes. When studying the economic effects of CSR, it is therefore crucial to
take this problem of greenwashing into account, and to understand its implications. This paper
investigates the extent to which firms use “green” communication as a substitute for or comple-
ment to CSR. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first economic analysis of greenwashing
providing empirical evidence on a large sample of firms.
According to Nelson (1970, 1974), a communication/advertising strategy depends on the
nature of the good itself. For search goods (whose quality can be known before purchasing
them), advertising should bring direct information on the characteristics of the product, while
1http://www.greenwashingindex.com/
2In this paper, we will broaden the definition of greenwashing by including social practices. The concept of
“social washing” is sometimes evoked.
3see www.stopgreenwash.org, the Greenpeace website dedicated to greenwashing.
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for experience goods (whose quality can only be assessed by trying them), advertising aims at
improving the general reputation of the firm. Because CSR can also have an impact on the
reputation of a firm, McWilliams and Siegel (2001) consider that CSR attributes are more likely
to be associated with experience goods than search goods. Siegel and Vitalino (2007) confirm
this intuition by testing the determinants of CSR empirically. But as such, it is very difficult to
assess the social or environmental quality of a product even after having consumed it. A product
containing a social or an environmental claim can therefore be considered as a credence good
(Darby and Karni, 1973), which means that the consumer will have trouble guessing the utility
derived from this product, even after having consumed it. For such goods, a communication
strategy which aims at improving the reputation of the firm is even more important. CSR and
green communication can be used by firms as strategic tools to reach this goal.
The literature highlights the theoretical mechanisms which explain why firms can invest in
CSR either aggressively, to increase the reputation of the firm in a broader communication
strategy, or defensively, to avoid a loss of reputation due to the threat of NGOs or other activists
(Baron, 2001, 2007, 2009). However, it ignores the capacity of a firm to communicate on a non-
existing or limited level of CSR. If CSR is mainly determined by the capacity to maintain or
increase their reputation, firms may be tempted to minimize their investment in CSR and to focus
on green communication. This is when greenwashing may appear. Lyon and Maxwell (2010)
model this greenwashing strategy by using a persuasion game. They define as a greenwasher a
firm that selectively discloses good news while retaining bad news. Grubb (2011) also shows how
a reputation strategy can be built in order to establish a “cover” for nondisclosure in the future.
Our approach differs from that of these two papers. We argue that the nature of greenwashing has
changed and our paper sheds some light on the new practices of greenwashers. Here, greenwashing
will be characterized as a situation in which firms decide to over-communicate regarding their real
level of CSR. It is not as such a situation in which firms are retaining bad news, but a situation in
which firms deliberately send non-verifiable information to mislead consumers. Our approach is
therefore complementary to that of Lyon and Maxwell (2010) since it explains another dimension
of greenwashing.
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Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. We propose a theoretical
framework based on Dewatripont and Tirole (2005). This model studies different modes of
communication between a sender (in our case, a firm) and a receiver (a consumer). There
are two levels of communication: the cue, which is a non-verifiable information, and the hard
information which is verifiable by the consumer but at a higher cost. We study the probability of
selling a product containing social or environmental claims based on different levels of cues (the
non-verifiable green communication) and hard information (the verifiable green communication).
We show that three types of greenwashing may appear: “hard greenwashing”, “constrained light
greenwashing” and “ad light greenwashing”. In the first case, firms will only send cues without
investing a single penny in CSR. In the last two cases, firms may reduce their optimal investments
in CSR either because of the presence of greenwashers, or because they can communicate on
a non-verifiable CSR claim. We then propose an original estimation of the determinants of
CSR-related communication for the 595 biggest European firms. In this respect, we provide
original data measuring the level of CSR, the level of cues and the hard information. The first
one is proxied by an original index built from Vigeo data. The level of (non-verifiable) green
communication is approximated by different measures of sustainable development reporting ,
while the hard information is proxied by the external certification of such reports. We find that
for a given level of CSR, the higher the level of green communication, the lower the probability
of asking for an external certification. When there is more CSR and more communication, the
incentives are lower for firms to improve the verifiability of their communication. We also show
a non-linear relation between the level of green communication and CSR, which allows us to
identify some “usual suspects” with a higher probability of greenwashing.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly exposes what aspects of greenwashing
have changed. In section 3, we present the setup of the model. In section 4, we introduce
the sequence of play and look at the equilibrium. We present the three sets of data we use in
this paper in section 5. In section 6, we show empirically when CSR and communication are
substitutes or complements. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
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2 The Changing Nature of Greenwashing
In their seminal paper on greenwashing, Lyon and Maxwell (2010) refer to a report issued by
TerraChoice on greenwashing practices (TerraChoice, 2007). This report highlights that the sin
which can be overwhelmingly found is the “sin of the hidden trade-off”. This sin consists in
arguing on a very precise and anecdotal environmental quality of a product without mentioning
all the other environmental aspects that are at stake in its production process.
Lyon and Maxwell (2010) propose a model that deals with this issue. In their paper, a green-
washer is a firm that selectively discloses good news (on the anecdotal aspect), while retaining
bad news (on the most important aspects). Since an activist punishes a firm that greenwashes,
they study the optimal reaction of a firm facing such an activist’s behavior.
TerraChoice issued a new greenwashing report in 2010 (TerraChoice, 2010) that, among
other things, sheds some light on the evolution of greenwashing practices. They show that the
occurrence of the “sin of the hidden trade-off” has dropped from 100% in 2007 to 27% in 2010.
Over the same period, two other sins have grown significantly: the “sin of no proof” and the “sin of
vagueness”. The former refers to “an environmental claim that cannot be substantiated by easily
accessible information or by a reliable third-party certification” (see www.sinsofgreenwashing.org)
and the latter is defined as “every claim that is so poorly defined or broad that its real meaning
is likely to be misunderstood”. The occurrence of the “sin of no proof" was 70% in 2010 (45% in
2007) and that of the “sin of vagueness" was around 65% in 2010 (15% in 2007).4 This clearly
indicates that there is a dual communication strategy by firms that may simultaneously have a
claim with only poor hard information and add to this claim other broad, vague claims in order
to increase their supposed credibility as green firms.5
The framework adopted in this paper refers to these two sins. Indeed, a firm may send more or
less (even not any) hard information and soft information, whereas it can freely announce a level
of CSR that the product contains directly or indirectly. Hard information aims at substantiating
4In the report, they underline that their definition has changed slightly. This may partly explain the decrease
in the sin of the hidden trade-off and the rise in the sins of no proof and vagueness. However, as they argue, the
magnitude of the evolution does indeed highlight a change in greenwashing practices.
5As the sum of both percentages exceeds 100%, at least 35% of firms have committed both sins.
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a claim as it is true by definition; any absence of such hard information is a sin of no proof. In
parallel, soft information is comparable to vagueness because it aims at increasing the reputation
of the firm without verifiable claims on its real commitment.
The aim of this paper is therefore to study the reputation effect and the relationship between
the firm and a consumer who questions more or less the CSR incorporated in the product. The
key element is whether the information is verifiable or not. As a consequence, in our paper, a
greenwasher is a priori a firm that has sent soft information to reduce the level of hard information
sent, in order to hide that it has not invested in CSR or has invested less than indicated by the
price of the product.
3 The Setup of the Model
Dewatripont and Tirole (2005) (D & T 05 hereafter) introduce two types of relations between a
sender and a receiver. The sender may exert an effort to send information in order to convince
the receiver (who may also exert an effort to assimilate the information) to choose action A. The
action A which we consider in this paper is buying a more expensive product because it may
contain CSR. This product is considered as a credence good (Darby and Karni, 1973). Social and
environmental claims are unobservable. The sender is a firm (F) and the receiver is a consumer
(C). The information transmission is considered as green communication.
3.1 Communication
We build on the model developed in D & T 05 that involves cue communication. The consumer
and the firm exchange hard and/or soft information (issue-relevant and cue messages, respec-
tively), the former being verifiable information on the CSR investment, whereas the latter only
provides non-verifiable information aimed at increasing the credibility of the firm.
The effort of the firm to communicate hard information (HI) is therefore comparable to a
verifiable certification of the CSR content of the firm, by an independent agency for instance.6
6See section 5 for discussion.
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The cues convey no hard information on the CSR content, but may convey information on
the type of the sender, or the firm. “Better news” is expected to raise the congruence between the
consumer and the firm. This congruence has to be understood here as an a priori convergence
of interest.7 A good quality cue is therefore a good green communication strategy. The higher
it is, the better the quality of the advertising communication.
In order to modify the ex-ante decision that depends on the ex-ante probability8, both actors,
the firm and the consumer, may also make an effort in order to communicate and assimilate hard
information. These efforts, labeled x and y for the firm and the consumer, respectively, are
costly.9 Their costs F (x) and C(y) are increasing and differentiable. As in D & T 05, we assume
that the communication efforts by the consumer and the firm are strategic complements.10 So
the probability that the consumer will assimilate the hard information is p = xy. If the firm
(the consumer) does not make any effort, the consumer (the firm) will not be able to successfully
communicate (assimilate) the information.
We build our model starting from a case that is not developed in D & T 05: when cues
coexist with the fact that the firm knows the consumer payoffs.11 In addition, we consider that
firms endogenously set the level of the cues they send and that they may freely announce the
supposed level rh which the product contains (sections 4.1 and 4.2). A last aspect we add is that
firms also endogenously set the level of CSR which they want to invest in (section 4.3).
7The “a priori ” is important as it allows us to draw a parallel between cues and advertising.
8See the next section for the formal definition of the ex-ante probability.
9Asking for an external certification is costly for the firm. But there is also a cost for the consumer to
assimilate the information. He must make an effort, spending some time searching for information and verifying
it, or financing a consumer organization to do so.
10Strategic complements are decisions made by two or more players which mutually reinforce each other (Bulow
et al., 1985).
11In their article, they consider that the sender is unaware of the receiver payoffs when a cue coexists with hard
information.
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3.2 Representative Consumer and Firm
3.2.1 Consumer (C, he)
We assume that C’s payoff under the status quo is 0. The consumer will then choose action A
only if he thinks that the product contains CSR. Thus, the consumer derives a higher indirect
utility from consuming a good that contains CSR, even though the price is higher.12 For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that he derives an indirect utility rh from consuming a product
that contains a level rh of CSR, thus ph < rh in this case.
A risk-neutral consumer establishes an ex-ante probability that the firm selling the product13
has invested in CSR accordingly to the announced level rh. Similarly to D & T 05, this ex-
ante probability is such that the lowest probability above which the consumer expects a positive
revenue from taking action A is
α∗ =
−(rl − ph)




where rl is the low indirect utility ; we assume that rl = 0. Buying a product that contains no
CSR at all at price ph yields a loss. The consumer does not know if the product “contains” CSR
since CSR is not in itself in the product, as it is a credence good.
Formally, the consumer’s utility function if the product contains CSR is given by
UC = xy(rh − ph)α− C(y) (2)
Finally, we need to define another value αmax that is a value such that the suspicious consumer
will buy the product even if he has looked for hard information and has not found it:
αmax =
ph − C(y∗)
(1− p)rH + ph (3)
12This assumption is consistent with experimental studies showing the willingness to pay for ethical products.
(See Dickson 2001; Pelsmacker et al. 2001, or MORI 2000).
13In the remainder of the paper, we will refer to products that “contain” CSR. However, in most cases, the CSR
itself is not incorporated in the product.
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There are two types of consumer, those who are gullible and those who are suspicious. This
distinction is close to the one found in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) that also introduces two types
of consumer, the sophisticated ones and the unsophisticated ones. The former are aware of the
existence of high add-on prices, contrary to the latter who are myopic in this respect.
When αmax > α∗ (the case we consider in this paper), the suspicious consumer will search for
hard information if the cue he receives, denoted α˜, is lower than αmax. The suspicious consumer
does not buy the product if he fails in assimilating the hard information. The gullible consumer
never looks for hard information (HI) when α˜ > α∗ and we assume that if he had to choose
between two products supposed to have the same rh, then he would choose the product associated
with the highest cue. Finally, both types of consumer rubber-stamp the recommendation that
they buy the product14 if the cue is at least equal to αmax. A consumer that has to choose
between two products associated with the same level of cue buys one of them with a probability
of 1/2.
3.2.2 Firms (F, she)
Firms sell their product (supposed to contain a level rh of CSR) at a price ph(rh). The price is
assumed to be increasing and concave with ph(0) = 0. Hence ph is here the reward for selling
the product. Firms know how consumers value the CSR content.
The payoff/utility of the firm is:
Uf = p ∗ ph − F (x∗)− Fa(α˜)− FCSR(rh) (4)
Where α˜ is the level of cue/advertising the firm sends, F (.) is the HI cost function, Fa(.) is
the cue-cost function and FCSR(.) is the CSR cost function. Also, the probability that the HI
is assimilated is p = x ∗ y′(α) where y′(y, α) is the effort which the firm expects the consumer
to make. This expected effort depends on the real effort, y (not observed, she assumes it is
multiplicative), and on the effect which advertising (the cue) has on the effort the consumer may
14This means that green advertising is convincing enough for consumers to buy the product.
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make (the firm forms this expectation thanks to previous marketing studies15 for instance).
The maximization yields the following equations:
y








Hence both x and α˜ are increasing in rh. Since the cost of sending α˜ is increasing and convex,
as that of sending the HI, at some point, an equilibrium is reached. Indeed, the marginal cost
of sending both the cue and the HI becomes too high compared to the marginal gain through
the increased probability that the consumer will assimilate the information. This is due to the
complementarity of the efforts by the firm and the consumer. Hence, increasing α˜ increases the
cost Fa directly and also increases x∗ indirectly through its effect on y∗.
4 Sequence of Play and Equilibrium
The sequence of play is as follows: first, the firm decides on the level of investment in CSR.
Second , she chooses the level of both types of communication, soft and hard information. Then,
the consumer observes the cue and decides whether to make an effort to assimilate the hard
information. Finally, he decides whether to buy the product or not. The communication efforts
are set non-cooperatively.
We first study the endogenous choice of the communication level with the consumer’s decision
to buy the product or not. Then we endogenize the level of investment in CSR. It is important
to notice that exogenous CSR and endogenous CSR cases correspond to two different situations
for firms. Either they have already absorbed the cost of CSR but want to communicate about it,
or they decide whether (and how much) to invest in CSR by taking their future communication
strategy into account in the decision process.
15This refers in a way to the goodwill effect in the advertising literature that states that past advertising
strategies influence today’s consumer behavior.
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4.1 Endogenous Choice of the Cue and the HI
In this section, we consider that the level of CSR is given and that the firm has to choose its
communication strategy. Hence, for the moment, we do not study the first step of the timing of
the event. The firm that has a positive level of CSR may send any level of cue and accordingly
can make an effort x∗ to convey hard information. The No-CSR firm must send a cue which is
either superior or equal to α∗ or to αmax, depending on her prior on the type of the consumer.
The No-CSR firm does not send any HI. A communication strategy is an (α˜, x∗) couple. Both
firms establish a prior about the type of the consumer: the probability that the consumer is
suspicious is δi ∈ [0, 1] for i = CSR,No− CSR.
As a reminder, if α˜ < α∗, both types of consumer look for HI. If α˜ ∈ [α∗, αmax], the suspicious
consumer looks for HI , whereas the gullible one buys the product. Finally, if α˜ > αmax, both
types buy the product. When a consumer looks for HI but does not assimilate it, he does not
buy the product.
4.1.1 CSR-Firm: Hard Information Communication
A CSR-firm willing to send hard information may send α˜ ∈ [0, αmax[ and hard information
according to her real level of CSR. In this case, she will send a combination (α˜, x∗) that maximizes
her expected payoff. We know that the consumer’s incentive to make an effort to assimilate the
HI increases on an interval with a higher α˜.16 In such a situation, the firm has an incentive to
increase α.
Two possibilities are then available: sending (α˜ ≥ α∗, x∗) or (α˜ < α∗, x∗). The strategy which
consists in sending (α˜ ≥ α∗, x∗) yields the following expected payoff:
δCSR[p ∗ ph − F (x∗)− Fa(α˜)] + (1− δCSR)[ph − F (x∗)− Fa(α˜)]
= ph[δCSRp+ (1− δCSR)]− F (x∗)− Fa(α˜) (7)
16The interval is either [0, α∗] if he is gullible or [0, αmax] if he is suspicious.
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This equation says that the CSR-firm has to bear the costs of sending both types of information.
Then, if the consumer is gullible, since α˜ > α∗, he rubber-stamps the action of buying the
product. If the consumer is suspicious, he decides to look for HI and with a probability p
succeeds in assimilating it and then buys the product. x∗ and α˜ come from the maximization
program of the firm (see section 3.2.2).
The strategy which consists in sending (α˜ < α∗, x∗) yields:
p ∗ ph − F (x∗)− Fa(α˜) (8)
Hence, gullible or not, the consumer looks for HI and buys the product with a probability p.
4.1.2 CSR-Firm/No CSR-Firm
Another possible strategy is not to send any hard information. This strategy is available to both
types of firm.
A No-CSR firm never sends any HI since if the consumer succeeds in assimilating it, he will
discover that the price is too high compared to the CSR content of the product. She will either
send (α∗, 0) or (αmax, 0) according to her prior on the type of the consumer. CSR-firms do not
have to send their true rh. Since these strategies imply that they will not send any HI, they will
choose to announce an rh considering the cue cost function Fa(.) and the price function ph(.).
Hence, the No-CSR firm and the CSR-firm behave similarly when they send an rh which is
different from the real level of CSR they have: both greenwash. However, sending their true rh
can also be a good strategy. In this case, the CSR-firm does not necessarily greenwash since the
rh announced is the real one. She simply prefers to only send soft information.
First, the firm can decide to send α˜ = α∗ without hard information. If the firm decides to
send (α∗, 0) it yields:
(1− δCSR)ph − Fa(α∗) (9)
12
Hence, if the consumer is gullible, he buys the product and if he is not, he does not.17
Second, sending (αmax, 0) yields :
ph − Fa(αmax) (10)
Here, when α˜ = αmax, the type of the consumer does not matter and he buys the product.
Given the four strategies above, we can show that:
Lemma 1 For both types of firm:
For a not too convex cue cost function and a not too concave price function, (αmax, 0)  (α∗, 0) 
(α˜, x∗) and a high rh is announced.
For a low δi and a steep cue cost function, a flat price function, (α∗, 0) is preferred.
Hence, for these two corner solutions: 1/ If both types of firm prefer (αmax, 0), the No-CSR
firm and the CSR-firm announce a high rh and each one has one chance out of two of selling her
product.
2/ If the CSR-firm prefers (α∗, 0), the No-CSR firm and the CSR-firm announce a low rh
and each one has one chance out of two of selling her product.
For all other situations, the CSR-firm:
3/ If she prefers the (α˜, x∗) strategy, she has to announce her true rh.
This forces No CSR-firms to decrease the announced rh so that they may prefer (α∗, 0) if δNo−CSR
is low.18
Importantly, announcing a high rh does not increase the incentive to prefer (αmax, 0) to (α˜, x∗).
Thus, CSR-firms may choose one or the other. This also underlines that a CSR-firm may well
send (αmax, 0) with her true rh.
17Of course, the assumption that the suspicious consumer does not buy the product if he fails in assimilating
the HI has consequences since it makes the probability of selling the product for No CSR-firms a lot lower: it
drops from (1− δGW ) + δGW (1− p) to (1− δGW ). However, qualitatively, this does not change the results.
18See proof in appendix.
13
This lemma also underlines that (αmax, 0) is a better strategy than (α∗, 0) if sending αmax is
not too costly, because the latter implies taking a risk: if the consumer is not gullible, he will
not buy the product.
CSR-firms will prefer the (α˜, x∗) strategy of dual communication modes (which in this case
are therefore complements, whereas the cue crowds out the HI in the other cases) for a given
rh if the associated probability of selling the product is high, if ph(rh) is low, if δCSR is low and
of course if the cue cost function is very convex, contrary to the HI cost function. A surprising
aspect is the low δCSR condition. It states that CSR-firms prefer the (αmax, 0) cue communication
strategy when their prior about the probability that the consumer is suspicious is high. This is
due to the fact that a higher δCSR increases the weight of the less profitable part of equation (7).
On the contrary, a low δCSR implies that there is a high probability of selling the product for
sure, despite the waste corresponding to the useless HI which the firm has sent.
4.2 Optimal Strategies of No-GW Firms When Facing GW-Firms
We now explicitly introduce greenwashing firms (GW-firms), which by definition cannot send
hard information. They can be of two types. First , she can have rl, i.e. be a No CSR-firm,
and try to convince the consumer that rh > 0. Second , she may have a level rh > 0 and try to
make the consumer believe that rh is even higher, i.e. this is a CSR-firm that prefers (αmax, 0)
or (α∗, 0).19
Hence GW-firms can either be CSR-firms and No-CSR firms (first subsection: all considered
firms are GW-firms) or solely No-CSR firms (second subsection: there is at least one CSR-firm
that plays a No-GW strategy). GW-firms play either (αmax, 0) or (α∗, 0) and No-GW firms play
either (α˜ < α∗, x∗) or (α˜ > α∗, x∗).
Definition 1 Let us define hard greenwashing as an (αmax, 0) or (α∗, 0) strategy where
(i) a No-CSR firm sells her product at a price ph, claiming it contains rh, or
(ii) a CSR-firm claims that the CSR-content in her product is higher than the one it has.
19Announcing rh is free, so it can be a lie. However, all firms that prefer these two strategies are not necessarily
lying.
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There are four situations to take into account in order to determine whether there is a dominant
strategy for CSR-firms:
(i) GW-firm sends (α∗, 0) and the consumer is gullible
(ii) GW-firm sends (αmax, 0) and the consumer is gullible
(iii) GW-firm sends (α∗, 0) and the consumer is not gullible
(iv) GW-firm sends (αmax, 0) and the consumer is not gullible
We start with two peripheral cases for which the CSR-firm plays either (αmax, 0) or (α∗, 0).
4.2.1 The CSR-Firm Sends (αmax, 0) or (α∗, 0)
The GW-firm sends either (αmax, 0) or (α∗, 0) according to her prior. Both firms are certain that
they will sell the product if δCSR = δGW = 0. Consequently, they should choose (α∗, 0) which is
less costly. However, we can show that this strategy is always dominated for the CSR-firm given
the behavior of the GW-firm.
Result 1 Even if δCSR = 0, the dominant strategy for the CSR-firm is to play (αmax, 0) if Fa(.)
is not too convex and ph(.) not too concave.
Hence, if both firms send (αmax, 0), pCSRs = pNo−CSRs = 1/2, with pis for i = CSR,No−CSR
the probability that the firm of type i sells her product.
Otherwise, they should stick to their first-best strategy. If (α∗, 0), the CSR-firm solely sells
her product (with a probability 1/2) if (i) the GW-firm has also sent (α∗, 0) and (ii) the consumer
is gullible.20
Thus, when the CSR-firm takes the strategy of the GW-firm into account, she will always play
(αmax, 0) if the cost of sending αmax is not too high. As a consequence, both types of firm are
merged and the hard greenwashing strategy is playable by the No-CSR firm and the CSR-firm.
20See proof in appendix.
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4.2.2 The CSR-Firm Plays (α˜, x∗)
The (α˜ > α∗, x∗) strategy is a good strategy only for situation (i): if the consumer is not
gullible, facing a GW-firm implies that she succeeds in selling her product solely when she sends
(α˜ < α∗, x∗).
When considering all strategies available to GW-firms and the possibility of facing either a
gullible or a suspicious consumer, one obtains the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Hard greenwashing) If Fa(αmax) is low enough, it is in the interest of the
CSR-firm and the No-CSR firm to choose (αmax, 0) and pCSRs = pGWs = 1/2.
Otherwise, the CSR-firm may choose (α˜ > α∗, 0) or (α˜ < α∗, x∗) where x∗ and α˜ are deter-
mined by equations (5) and (6).21
There is no dominant strategy for the No-GW firm. Hence, when CSR-firms have internalized
the cost of the CSR, their strategic behavior does not allow to rule out the hard greenwashing
strategy, except when the consumer is not gullible and she has sent (α˜ < α∗, x∗). Hence, hard
greenwashing may even be a good strategy with (α∗, 0): even a wise consumer cannot discriminate
between both types of firm given their advertising strategies.
In terms of probability of selling the product, the (αmax, 0) strategy weakly dominates (α∗, 0)
for GW-firms. However, as the former is more expensive than the latter, there is no strategy
that dominates.
As a consequence, the hard greenwashing strategy cannot be excluded and may be profitable
in some situations. Either the consumer will end up with a CSR-product that has less CSR than
the price indicates, or he will buy a No-CSR product at a prohibitive price. The (α˜ > α∗, x∗)
strategy is not of interest and becomes (α˜ > α∗, 0). We will see that when one considers that
the choice to invest in CSR is costly, then the firm can avoid this strategy. That is, a CSR-firm
whose first-best would be sending (α˜ > α∗, x∗) for the optimal level of CSR she chooses will
either turn to greenwashing, (α˜ > α∗, 0), or to less cue communication, (α˜ < α∗, x∗).
21See proof in appendix.
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4.3 Endogenous CSR
Now, we reintroduce the first step of the timing of the event: firms first choose their level of
CSR before defining their communication strategies. When a firm chooses its level of CSR
endogenously, a firm sending αmax is necessarily a no-CSR firm. The reason is simple: a firm
that plans to send αmax knows that the consumer will rubber-stamp action A without looking
for HI. The only reason for investing in CSR is the need to send hard information (which is
obviously impossible if there is nothing to show). As a consequence, this strategy is ruled out as
the consumer knows this.22
It is worth pointing out that if CSR is endogenous, it is not optimal to invest in CSR and
send an untrue rh. This would simply be a pure waste. If the consumer is suspicious and seeks
HI, either he will assimilate the HI and refuse to buy the product because it is too expensive
considering its CSR content, or he will not assimilate it and will then refuse to buy the product.
If the consumer is gullible, then sending HI is either useless or will have the same consequence
as for the suspicious consumer if α˜ < α∗.
A last remark is that the (α∗, 0) strategy remains possible, hence hard greenwashing is not
totally ruled out. Moreover, the fact it is not ruled out is the reason why firms that plan to
invest in a positive amount of CSR may switch from their first-best strategy to their second-best
strategy.
4.3.1 How the Presence of GW-Firms Modifies the Strategy of CSR-Firms
Now, an equilibrium is defined by (ri, α˜, x∗) for i = l, h. As argued before, a first-best strategy
involving (rh, α˜ > α∗, x∗) is a risky behavior since it is mostly dominated (see proof of proposition
1). Now that the CSR is an endogenous choice, a firm may avoid this issue by choosing a second-
best solution. The firm may then choose to underinvest in CSR so that the equilibrium solution
becomes (r′h < rh, α˜ < α∗, x∗). She may prefer the greenwashing strategy. Finally, she may
decide not to do anything and will then produce a normal product with no CSR claim.
22We consider that even a gullible consumer is aware of this.
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Interestingly, firms that have quite a competitive cost function both in terms of CSR and
communication are not necessarily those that will in fine opt to invest in CSR. Indeed, their
favorable cost function for cue communication may lead them to prefer to greenwash, although
they would otherwise have chosen a quite high rh with an (rh, α˜ > α∗, x∗) strategy.
Concretely, we now take the cost of “producing” CSR, FCSR(rh), into account. Not surpris-
ingly, when investing in CSR is costly, a firm is less likely to prefer a strategy involving the two
types of communication.
A firm thinking that δi is rather high should prefer to choose rh such that α˜ < α∗. Indeed,
in such a case, she should rule out the greenwashing strategy because a suspicious consumer
will undoubtedly always prefer to choose the product that contains CSR. That is, the suspicious
consumer will choose to look for HI for the poorly advertised product which by definition will
be sold solely if the consumer has found the hard information sent.
The following proposition sums up the consequences of the (possible) presence of GW-firms
on the market. That is, how a future No-GW firm prefers her second-best strategy in order to
increase the probability of selling her product in the presence of GW-firms.
Proposition 2 (Constrained light greenwashing) Due to the presence of GW-firms, firms
whose first-best is (rh, α˜ > α∗, x∗) may reduce their optimal investment in CSR to their second-




< 0, (ii) ∂y′/∂α is large and (iii) ∂ph/∂rh is small, then α˜ does not decrease much,




> 0, (ii) ∂y′/∂α is small and (iii) ∂ph/∂rh is large, then α˜ decreases sharply and
x∗ may increase, or at least decrease less. However, the decrease in rh is rather important.
If Fa(α) is not too convex, then she chooses to greenwash.23
This proposition underlines that the consequences of the presence of GW-firms are twofold,
according to the type of potential CSR-firms they face. It could increase the number of GW-firms.
It could also induce a decrease in both the optimal rh and the level of cue communication. This
23See proof in appendix.
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last case corresponds to constrained light greenwashing. We define constrained light greenwashing
as reducing the optimal level of rh compared to a first-best strategy in response to the competition
from GW-firms, combined with a low decrease in cue communication and a decrease in HI
communication. Thus, interestingly, the presence of GW-firm may or may not lead the firm to
constrained light greenwashing. However, when it does not, the result is a strong decrease in the
level of CSR. Firms that have a low δi may prefer to send (α˜ > α∗, 0), i.e. to greenwash even
more.
When CSR-firms make very optimistic projections on the efficiency of a communication cam-
paign and/or when ph is moderately influenced by rh, then the decrease in CSR, as well as in
cue communication, is moderate. On the contrary, HI communication is very likely to decrease.
If rh has a strong positive effect on ph, then ∂α
∗
∂rh
> 0, so condition (ii) is not fulfilled. If the
effect is small, then condition ** il manque qqch ici ** does not hold. We can conclude that this
situation happens in very inelastic or elastic markets.
Alternatively, a potential CSR-firm may reduce its optimal investment in CSR sharply, but
green advertising will also be strongly reduced and her efforts in communicating HI may even
increase. On moderately price-elastic markets, this situation is more likely to occur.
CSR-firms whose first-best strategy is (rh, α˜ < α∗, x∗) play their first-best strategy. These
are firms that do not expect advertising to be very effective on the effort which the consumer
may make to get HI and/or firms that have a cue cost function such that ∂2Fa(α)/∂2α >>> 0.
4.3.2 Does the Possibility of Advertising Modify the Strategy of CSR-Firms?
We now want to know whether the possibility of sending a cue reduces the optimal level of CSR
which the firm chooses. Let us compare models with and without the possibility of sending a
cue in which firms can commit to rh if CSR is practiced and see the relative incentives of firms
willing to practice CSR. As argued previously, the possibility of revealing rh does not suppress
all incentives to send cues. Moreover, if cues are relatively cheap compared to the investment in
CSR, the firm may prefer a quite low level of rh and send a high cue. Hence, the possibility of
sending a cue, everything else being equal, helps to sell her product with a lower level of CSR.
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Two opposed effects are at work when the possibility of sending cues is introduced. According
to the effect that dominates, this will increase or decrease the optimal investment in CSR by the
firm. Cues and CSR may either be complements or substitutes. In case of substitution, we call
this ad light greenwashing and this is the second strategy we will seek to identify empirically.
Proposition 3 (Ads light greenwashing) If rh is continuous and endogenous, then the pos-
sibility of sending cues may reduce the optimal level of CSR.
In this case, the effort made by the firm to communicate hard information increases.24
We call this ad light greenwashing because firms keep investing in CSR, yet less so than without
cues. However, contrary to constrained light greenwashing, in this case it is the mere possibility
of communicating through green advertising that reduces the incentive to invest in CSR. In
the previous situation, greenwashing was a constrained behavior. Here, it is a purely voluntary
behavior, and as such more condemnable. The investment in green advertising and the efficiency
of advertising in convincing consumers reduce the amount a firm is willing to invest in CSR.
Finally, we have to note that the effort made by the firm to communicate hard information
increases if she reduces the optimal level of CSR.
To sum up the theoretical part, we have determined three cases of greenwashing. First, when
firms have internalized their investment in CSR, the possibility of what we have labeled hard
greenwashing is absolutely not ruled out. Firms that have a comparative advantage in sending
soft information will be those that opt for the hard greenwashing strategy. Beyond the trivial
effect of the relative advantage associated with sending hard information that will govern firms
that have a positive level of CSR in choosing between a greenwashing strategy and an “honest”
one, the degree of complementarity between the consumer and the firm on the communication
of hard information is important. A firm that is more scrutinized by consumer groups or NGOs
is likelier to send hard information and less likely to greenwash.
The other two cases of greenwashing are labeled light greenwashing as they involve an in-
vestment in CSR; however, this investment is smaller than without greenwashing. First, ad
24See proof in appendix.
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light greenwashing encompasses firms which reduce their optimal level of CSR because they can
advertise for their green products. However, these firms increase their effort in the communica-
tion of hard information. Second, constrained light greenwashing is found when the presence of
greenwashers leads a firm that has invested in CSR to reduce her amount of CSR investment.
Greenwashing can be considered either as resulting in a limited decrease in advertising or a
sharp decrease in the level of CSR investment. Choosing one or the other interpretation of what
greenwashing is will have an impact on the conclusions which can be drawn. Although a strong
decrease in CSR may not be a desirable situation, one could argue that it is more relevant to
consider that greenwashing means relatively high advertising, with a decrease of hard information
communication. This corresponds to the consumer forming a positive reaction to the ex-ante
probability that there is a high level of CSR, combined with a high predicted effectiveness of
green advertising and a small price elasticity of the product to its level of CSR.
Based on proposition 2, two types of firm may be of interest. Either a firm can exhibit a
low level of CSR, a low level of soft information communication and a relatively high level of
hard information communication, or she can exhibit high levels of CSR and cues with a low level
of hard information. Based on proposition 3, firms will exhibit low levels of CSR, with high
levels of soft and hard information. Hence, if we go back to the TerraChoice terminology, this
indicates that the sins of no proof and of vagueness, in the case of constrained light greenwashing,
are complementary, which explains why they have increased simultaneously. Conversely, these
two sins are substitutes in the case of ad light greenwashing, which explains why the sin of
vagueness has grown more quickly in recent years. We now turn to empirics to assess whether
the predictions of the theoretical model are confirmed by the data.
5 Data
According to the model, we need three sets of information : (i) the effective level of social
responsibility for the firms, (ii) the “hard information” which is a reliable certification provided
by the firm in order to give consumers a clear assessment of the CSR level, and (iii) the “cues”,
21
that is non-verifiable information or communication related to CSR provided by the firm, which
can also be seen as advertising.
5.1 CSR, Cues and Hard Information
The CSR level will be approximated by the extra-financial rating provided by Vigeo for European
firms. Vigeo’s ratings are used by SRI funds in order to choose the firms that meet given ethical
criteria. In our view, these data provide the most reliable estimation of the effective level of
CSR.25 Igalens and Gond (2005) showed the relevance of Vigeo-ARESE26 data: “a proxy that is
particularly suitable for Corporate Social Performance, at least from a theoretical point of view”27.
It is noteworthy that the Vigeo ranking is not public and therefore cannot be used by firms as
a way to increase the congruence between firms and consumers, as advertising or cue messages.
Furthermore, Vigeo ranks all firms which are included in the Dow Jones Stoxx 600 index, and
not only voluntary firms. This excludes the risk of a possible selection bias. Consumers do
not know the Vigeo ranking for each firm, they can only observe their level of “soft” and “hard
information”.
The most difficult challenge is to find an acceptable proxy for greenwashing and communi-
cation related to CSR. Unfortunately, firms do not have a specific budget for “CSR advertising”.
25Cochran andWood (1984) argued that there are two generally accepted measures of CSR: the reputation index
(Moskowitz, 1975) and content analysis (such as the data we use here). They found advantages and drawbacks
to both methods. Tsoutsoura (2004) criticized reputation indexes stating that “it is unclear exactly what these
indicators measure”. Igalens and Gond (2005) added three other measures: measurements based on analyzing
the content of annual reports, pollution indices, and perceptual measurements derived from questionnaire-based
surveys. Waddock and Graves (1997) drew upon the Kinder Lydenberg Domini (KLD) rating system and used
these data to measure CSR. Tsoutsoura (2004) or Siegel and Vitalino (2007) used these measurements. Vigeo
can be considered as the European counterpart to KLD with comparable methods. Igalens and Gond (2005)
compared KLD and Vigeo-ARESE data and noted some distinctions which are mainly explained by different
cultural sensitivities. Methodologically, they found that the scoring-quality proxy is always more favorable to the
Vigeo-ARESE data (see Mattingly and Greening (1999) for a detailed analysis of KLD data.). More recently,
some authors have proposed new tools for measuring corporate contributions to sustainability: sustainable value-
added (Figge and Hann, 2001), but there is no consensus on the relevance of such a measurement (Korhonen,
2003)
26The analysis was carried out on the French extra-financial rating agency ARESE which merged with Vigeo
in 2002. We assume that former ARESE data and Vigeo data are similar as the same methodology applies.
27However, they insist on the nuances introduced by the observation of the different sub-components of the
index.
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The alternative would be to use the general advertising budget, but this strategy will not be
satisfactory as we cannot distinguish firms with a specific strategy linked to their CSR. This is
why we propose to use the general level of sustainable development reporting as a proxy for the
general level of CSR communication.
In parallel with the rise of social and environmental concerns, the number of extra-financial
reports has skyrocketed in the last few years. These reports take various forms. Contrary
to financial reports which are compulsory for firms quoted in the stock exchange, these extra-
financial reports are not homogenized and are purely voluntary.28
Our hypothesis is that reporting is part of the overall communication related to CSR. A firm
may produce extensive reports and over-communicate considering their real commitment and
investment in CSR. In most cases, these reports are subjective and give a partial overview of
the real CSR content in the products sold by the firm (thus echoing the theory of information
dissimulation in Lyon and Maxwell 2010). In many other cases, information is not verified (thus
echoing the theory presented in this paper). The analysis of the content of annual reports has
been used in the literature as a general proxy for corporate social performance (Dejean and
Oxibar, 2003). However, as noted by Ullman (1985) and Igalens and Gond (2005), the analysis
of annual reports involves a measurement of “social discourse” rather than of CSR per se. It is
clearly our hypothesis here.
One can argue that few consumers actually read these reports. But since consumer orga-
nizations and other NGOs examine these reports, it is not problematic for our analysis. They
transmit the relevant information through campaigns or reports (see for instance the alternative
sustainable reports on several major oil companies published by the Friends of the Earth NGO).
The general public image of firms will thus be influenced indirectly by these reports, and by the
opinion relayed by NGOs. As it seems reasonable to assume that there is a strong correlation
between the general level of advertising on “green issues” (which is not measurable) and the
global level of reporting on such issues, we can use the latter as a proxy for the former.
28There has been a development of laws concerning social and environmental reporting (ORSE, 2004) at the
European level in recent years. However, the format of such reports is generally not very well defined in these
laws and sanctions are not stipulated.
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Sustainable development reporting has improved in the last few years. Different organiza-
tions have started providing clear and homogenized guidelines. Following the model of financial
reports, a growing number of firms ask for an external assurance of their sustainable development
reports. A third party then checks the thoroughness of the information provided by the firm,
and can formulate a conclusion on the sincerity of this information. Professional standards such
as the International Standard on Assurance Engagement (ISAE 3000) may help third parties in
this assurance work.
We then propose an empirical distinction between “soft information” and “hard information”.
Soft information will be measured by the general level of reporting. Hard information will be
surrogated by the assurance of sustainable development reports by a third party. The data for
both come from Corporateregister.com.
5.2 Index of Corporate Social Responsibility
We create an original index of the effective level of CSR based on Vigeo data. Vigeo proposes
different CSR principles of universal application translated into action steps for management.
They propose 6 evaluation fields and 37 criteria. These fields are: (1) Human Rights, (2)
Human Resources, (3) Environment, (4) Business Behavior, (5) Community Involvement, and
(6) Corporate Governance. These objectives are evaluated on the basis of about 200 action steps.
As the Vigeo ranking is not public, this value is unknown to consumers.
Vigeo provides detailed data on 595 European firms29. These firms are included in the Dow
Jones Stoxx 600 index, which includes the 600 biggest capitalizations at the European level.30
Out of these 595 firms, 171 are from the United Kingdom, 88 are French and 52 are German.
The banking and insurance sectors are the most represented in the sample, with respectively 64
and 35 firms.31
29Vigeo is extending the coverage of its database to American and Asian firms. However, the coverage is not
significant yet. As a result, we have limited our analysis to European firms.
30We do not have exactly 600 firms in the database because of the exit and entry of some firms during the
period.
31See Bazillier and Vauday (2009) for a more detailed description of the Vigeo data.
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The main goal of the analysis is to see whether we can observe global patterns of behavior
regarding different CSR aspects and to give an assessment of the global level of CSR according
to the different items. Data analysis is a very useful methodology to reach these two main
objectives. Igalens and Gond (2005) propose to use data analysis to evaluate the quality of the
scoring. We will then use the same methodology to get global estimates of the general level of
CSR using Principal Component Analysis (PCA).32
The first axis can be interpreted as a proxy for the general level of CSR. We make this
hypothesis considering the high correlation between each of the Vigeo items and the coordinates
on the first axis. The correlation between the coordinates on the first axis and the performance in
terms of human resources, human rights, business behavior, and environment is very high (over
0.80). This correlation is lower with community involvement (0.73) and corporate governance
(0.46).33 The greater the coordinate on the first axis, the better the CSR performance for the
firm. In order to facilitate the interpretation of the index, we will transform the coordinates on
the first axis into an index included between 0 (the worst CSR performance) and 1 (the best
CSR performance). We call this variable CSR.
According to this interpretation of the first axis, the best CSR performances are observed
in Norway (0.59), in the Netherlands (0.55) and in France (0.54). The worst performances
are observed in Iceland (0.14), Ireland (0.26) and Greece (0.29). In terms of sectors, the best
performances are observed in the sector of waste and water utilities (0.61), in the chemical sector
(0.60) and in the energy sector (0.60). On the other side of the spectrum, the food sector (0.35),
and the mechanical component sector (0.41) have the worst marks in terms of CSR performance.
32See Bazillier and Vauday (2009) for a more detailed presentation of the PCA results.
33This lower influence of community involvement and corporate governance is consistent with the definition of
corporate social responsibility. Corporate governance can be considered as a broader concept than CSR itself and
community involvement relates to activities which are not directly linked to the main activity of the firm. On the
contrary, CSR is directly linked to this activity.
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5.3 An Estimation of CSR-Related Communication: the Level of CSR-
Reporting
** For each firm in our sample, we collected different information on their CSR reports. For this,
we used Corporateregister.com which is a global directory of CSR resources, including a CSR
report directory. Thanks to this directory, it is possible to determine whether or not firms have
already produced a report, how many reports have been produced, how many pages each report
contains, the type of report and whether the report is externally assured. Of course, having
numerous, extensive reports does not mean as such that the company has a global strategy of
greenwashing. However, thanks to the comparison with our first CSR index, we can detect some
“usual suspects” whose specificity is to have a huge reporting/communicating activity but a very
low level of CSR.
From these data, we build two measures of CSR communication: the communication ex-
perience (measured by the total number of reports) and the communication effort which is
a combination of (1) the number of reports per year and (2) the number of pages in the last
report.
We choose to focus only on the quantitative aspects of CSR-related communication. We are
not interested in content analysis to evaluate the quality of such reports. Here, what we need is
an evaluation of the quantity of “cue messages” sent by firms in order to raise their congruence
with consumers. If the information is verified by an external source, it becomes “issue-relevant
information” (hard information). The real level of CSR is unknown to consumers (it is typically
a credence good) and is proxied by the CSR index built from Vigeo data.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for these variables.
26
Table 1: Descritive Statistics: CSR Reports
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of Reports 4.79 4.95 0 29
Year of the first report 2001 4.03 1975 2008
Number of Pages (last report) 47.89 60.73 0 436
Number of Reports (per year) 0.73 0.86 0 16
Variable Yes (%) No (%)
Report 70.54 29.46
Externally assured 35.02 64.98
Source: Corporateregister.com
6 Empirical Specification and Results: Who Are the Usual
Suspects?
In this section, we test some of the implications of our model empirically. The empirical strategy
will then follow the sequence of the model (see Figure 1). We will first estimate the probability
of sending hard information, considering the level of CSR and the level of soft information as
explanatory variables. We will then infer an explanation for the level of soft information, as we
know that this level depends on the levels of hard information and CSR. Lastly, we will propose
an additional statistical approach to highlight the non-linear relationship between CSR and the
level of soft information.
Figure 1: Sequence of Events
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6.1 Estimating the Probability of Sending Hard Information and of an
External Assurance of Sustainable Development Reports
“Hard information” in our model is approximated by externally assuring a sustainable devel-
opment report (variable CRcheck). This variable is thus a dummy. Almost 35% of the firms
in our sample externally assure their reports. In order to test the probability of sending hard
information, we propose the following specification:
Prob(CRcheck = 1) = φCSR + ϕX + γZ +  (11)
CSR is our CSR index and φ the estimated coefficient associated with CSR. X is the matrix
of variables related to CSR communication and ϕ the column vector associated with the matrix
X. Z is a set of control variables.  is the error term and is assumed to be i.i.d. Estimations are
performed using a robust probit estimator.
Control variables include the age of the firm, her level of assets (both in log)34, country dum-
mies and sector dummies. Nevertheless, some communication behaviors are really sector-specific.
These sector dummies therefore capture almost all the information which we are interested in.
Even if most of our results remain valid when including these sector dummies, we will systemat-
ically present the results with and without these dummies.
From the theoretical model, we know that the probability of sending hard information is a
function of the level of CSR, but is also impacted by the level of soft information. Propositions 2
and 3 tell us that the ratio of CSR over the amount of hard information sent may vary according
to the effect of the CSR on the soft information sent. We will model this effect through the
inclusion of an interaction term X.CSR.35 The final specification is thus the following:
34The data come from Orbis (Bureau van Dijk).
35As this heterogeneity in the effect of CSR on the probability of sending hard information is directly linked to
the level of soft information, we choose for simplification purposes not to use random coefficient models, but to
express this source of heterogeneity as a function of the level of CSR communication (X).
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Prob(CRcheck = 1) = φCSR + ϕX + µX.CSR + γZ +  (12)
However, it is obvious that the level of hard information (CRcheck) also has an effect on the
level of soft information (X). If a firm decides to externally assure her sustainable development
report, she may decide to decrease her level of soft information conjointly. This creates a bias
of reverse causality that we correct by instrumenting the variable X. We thus decide to use
Newey’s minimum chi-squared estimator in our probit model with endogenous regressors. The
challenge is therefore to find an instrumental variable which is (1) correlated with X (the level of
soft information) but (2) without a direct impact on the probability of sending hard information.
We propose to use the log of operational revenue36 as an instrumental variable. There is an
important literature on the economic effects of advertising (see Bagwell (2007) for an extensive
overview). Among these economic effects, the impact of advertising on sales (and thus on oper-
ational revenue) is one of the most important. But the causality can go in the other direction.
Larger firms are also much more likely to advertise. As noticed by Bagwell (2007), “Advertising
may be associated with higher sales, because firms respond to greater sales with greater advertis-
ing.” Furthermore, there is also a relation between advertising and concentration which is indeed
influenced by the level of sales. Kaldor (1950) argues that advertising scale economies exist so
that big firms can finance large advertising expenditure more easily.
On the contrary, the link between operational revenue and the probability of sending hard
information is very weak. We do not see any reason for a firm to ask for an external certification or
not, depending on her level of sales. To put it differently, we consider as a reasonable assumption
that the level of sales largely determines the general level of advertising and soft communication.
This also must be correlated with the general level of CSR communication. But the type of
36The data come from Orbis (Bureau van Dijk). An alternative would be to use the log of sales, which is more
consistent with the highlights of the literature on advertising. However, the level of sales is not available for banks
and financial firms. These firms represent a significant share of our sample and it is also interesting to study the
possible influence of greenwashing for such firms. We thus decide to use operational revenue which has an obvious
link with the level of sales and is more relevant for banks and financial firms.
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communication, i.e. whether this communication is based on “tangible and verifiable” information
or not, has other determinants than the level of sales.
As X is part of X.CSR, we must also instrument this interaction term. We then build a new
interaction term between the log of operational revenue (our instrument) and CSR. It will be
used as an additional instrument.37
We assume that CSR does not need to be instrumented. The sequence proposed by the model
clearly states that the level of CSR predetermines the level of soft and hard information. Reverse
causality is not likely to be a problem for this variable, as the level of communication cannot
have an impact per se on the level of CSR.
Table 2 presents the results of probit estimates and probit estimates with instrumental vari-
ables, using the number of pages in the last report as a proxy for soft information. Tables 6
and 7 in the appendix F show the results respectively using the total number of reports and the
number of reports per year as proxies for soft information.
The relation between soft information and hard information seems to be very correlated with
the sector. A rapid statistical exploration of the data by sector shows that the standard error
for both measures of communication is relatively low within sectors. This is why the inclusion of
sector dummies is problematic in this set of estimates. If the results in probit are very similar
with and without sector dummies, the results obtained when instrumenting the soft information
variable are much less convincing when sector dummies are included.
The level of soft information is always positively correlated with a higher probability of send-
ing hard information (except for estimates with instrumental variables and sector dummies).
CSR always has a positive and significant impact on the probability of sending hard informa-
tion, but this result is not significant anymore when instrumenting the soft information variable
(the sign of the coefficient remains the expected one). The most interesting result is the sign
37Unfortunately, it was not possible to find any additional instruments. Firm-specific data are limited and
specific data related to the different dimensions of CSR communication are not available. Since we have as many
instruments as endogenous regressors, we cannot test the orthogonality of our instruments using the Hansen-
Sargan statistic for instance. Nevertheless, we observe that the sales are a good predictor of the level of soft
information (in the first step of the two-step probit estimates), but are not significant when we include this
variable in the estimates of the probability of sending hard information.
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Table 2: Probit Estimates of Hard Information (Externally Assured)
Dependent variable Crcheck Crcheck Crcheck Crcheck
CSR 3.030*** 2.860*** 1.378 1.724
(5.470) (4.797) (1.067) (0.796)
Number of Pages (last report) 0.0146*** 0.0111*** 0.0727*** 0.0665
(3.478) (2.616) (3.437) (1.576)
CSR x Number of Pages -0.0171** -0.0142** -0.0671** -0.0652*
(-2.568) (-1.989) (-2.372) (-1.809)
Assets (in log) 0.0912** 0.308*** 0.0994 0.221
(2.073) (4.176) (1.409) (1.362)
Age (in log) -0.0189 -0.0353 -0.0545 -0.0275
(-0.181) (-0.329) (-0.333) (-0.168)
Constant -3.588*** -7.316*** -3.850** -6.381**
(-4.275) (-5.657) (-2.554) (-2.267)
Country-specific fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Instrumental Variables NO NO YES YES
Observations 489 479 483 474
Pseudo R2 0.2495 0.3089
Robust z-statistics in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Probit estimates with endogenous regressors use Newey’s minimum chi-squared estimator
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and significance of the interaction term. In all estimates, the interaction term is negative and
significant. This result is valid for all variables of soft information and also when these variables
are instrumented.
The estimated coefficient of the interaction term should be interpreted cautiously. As shown
by Ai and Norton (2003), the magnitude of the interaction effect in non-linear models does not
equal the marginal effect of the interaction term and can be of opposite sign. We thus use the
methodology used by Ai and Norton (2003) to estimate the magnitude and standard errors of
the interaction effect correctly. Our main result is confirmed. For all estimates, the correct
interaction effect is negative for almost all observations in the sample.
Consequently, the positive sign of the soft information proxy confirms proposition 3 in the
theoretical model which states that when the level of soft information increases, the level of
hard information also increases. The negative sign of the interaction term validates proposition
2 which states that soft and hard information are substitutes for firms that practice CSR. One
may find either firms with a quite high level of soft information and a relatively low level of hard
information or the reverse. Additionally, in this proposition, both the cue level and the CSR
level decrease in similar proportion, hence the relative cue level compared to the CSR level does
not change strongly. When both levels jointly decrease, then the level of hard information also
decreases. This also corresponds to the empirical results.
Proposition 3 also states that the presence of soft information induces a decrease in the CSR
level. This amounts to an increase in the relative cue level with respect to the CSR level. Hence,
the hard information should increase. This is what proposition 3 predicts and what the negative
sign of the interaction term means.
6.2 What Are the Determinants of the Level of Soft Communication?
The next step in the empirical strategy is to estimate the level of “soft information”. Soft in-
formation is a type of communication which is not directly verifiable, but increases the level of
congruence between the firm and the consumer. We use different levels of sustainable develop-
ment reporting as proxies for soft information.
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Similarly to hard information, the level of soft information is supposed to be determined first
by the CSR level. However, the theoretical model predicts several possible relationships between
CSR and the level of soft information. In most cases, an increase in CSR is supposed to increase
the level of soft information. However, it is actually possible for firms with a low level of CSR
to increase the level of soft information dramatically in order to compensate for this low level of
CSR. From proposition 1, we know that the hard greenwashing strategy is playable, and from
proposition 2, we know that firms can still play hard greenwashing, despite a lower level of cue
compared to the one predicted by proposition 1. We also show theoretically that the “optimal
level” of CSR may be lower when firms can communicate (see proposition 3).
We are lacking a counterfactual to show the latter theoretical result empirically. However,
what we can do is show that the positive and monotonic relation between CSR and soft infor-
mation is not relevant for some firms. What does it mean empirically? If our data fits with
our theoretical model, we should observe two things: (1) a positive trend between CSR and soft
information, and (2) a group of firms outside this trend, characterized by a higher level of soft
information for a comparable level of CSR. The problem is that raw econometric results will not
help us to identify this group of firms. Therefore, we propose to try to identify it graphically
and then to add a new step in the empirical strategy. This additional step will only be used to
identify the “usual suspects”, i.e. firms which over-communicate regarding their effective level
of CSR. In order to do so, we will propose to put CSR as a dependent variable to highlight a
possible non-linear relation between these variables. However, it should be clear that this last
set of estimates does not aim at identifying a causal relation, as the sequence of the model is
clear. CSR determines the level of communication and not the contrary. This “extended analysis
of correlation” can be seen as a “statistical projection” and only aims at identifying a non-linear
relation that cannot be shown with the current set of estimates.
The other problem which we face is related to the possible interaction between the levels
of soft and hard information. As we showed in the previous section, soft information has an
impact on the probability of sending hard information. The coefficient of CRcheck will thus be
biased in the analysis. It is not possible to find correct measures that will be correlated with
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the probability of sending hard information, but not with the level of soft information. The first
reason is that we are very limited by the set of possible instrumental variables; none of them
can fulfill both conditions. However, the main reason is directly explained by the type of proxies
which we have chosen for soft and hard information. The level of soft information is proxied
by different quantitative measures which are related to sustainable development reports. Hard
information is proxied by externally assuring these reports. This means that any factor that will
have an impact on the externally assured reports will also have, by construction, an impact on
the reports (whether externally assured or not). We should therefore accept this shortcoming
and be very cautious in the interpretation of the estimated coefficient of CRcheck. The main
goal here is to identify relations between CSR and soft information. The consequence of such a
shortcoming is therefore limited.
We then propose the following specification:
X = β1CSR + β2CRcheck + β3Z + β4Y +  (13)
Where X is the level of soft information proxied by our three measures of sustainable de-
velopment reporting, CSR is our index of the general level of CSR, CRcheck the level of hard
information proxied by externally assured reports, Z a set of control variables similar to the
one used in the last set of estimates, and Y is the log of operational revenue that we add as an
additional control variable, since we showed in the previous instrumentation strategy that it can
be used to explain the general communication level. The error term  is assumed to be i.i.d..
Table 3 shows the results when using the number of pages of the last report as a proxy for
soft information, while Table 8 in Appendix G shows the results when using our two alternative
proxies for soft information. For each proxy for soft information, we propose four different
specifications. First, we only use assets, age and country dummies as control variables, without
CRcheck (** since we have seen that this coefficient may be biased). Then we add Y (the log of
operational revenue). In a third step, we add CRcheck to compare the results. Finally, we also
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add sector dummies to have a specification with the full set of control variables.38
Table 3: OLS Estimates of Soft Information (Number of Pages)
Dep. Variable Number of Pages Number of Pages Number of Pages Number of Pages
CSR 119.2*** 102.8*** 94.68*** 94.81***
(8.983) (7.817) (6.881) (6.611)
CRcheck 12.02** 10.73*
(2.228) (1.846)
Assets (in log) 0.936 -3.974** -3.833** -0.472
(0.542) (-2.113) (-2.056) (-0.127)
Age (in log) 1.211 -0.586 -0.265 -0.501
(0.348) (-0.169) (-0.0783) (-0.133)
Op. Revenue (in log) 11.39*** 10.28*** 6.489**
(5.478) (4.782) (2.105)
Constant -42.87 -131.4*** -118.2*** -85.17**
(-1.245) (-3.323) (-2.958) (-2.148)
Observations 490 484 484 482
R-squared 0.352 0.388 0.394 0.402
Country-specific fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects NO NO NO YES
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As expected, the CSR level has a positive and significant impact on the level of soft communi-
cation, whatever the proxy for communication chosen and the list of control variables included in
the specification. Hence, again, proposition 3 in the theoretical model is validated, as it precisely
predicts these two positive signs. However, this result does not allow us to identify the “usual
suspects” that have a very high level of soft communication compared with their level of CSR.
But the graphical representation of this result will help us do so. Figure 2 is the “Component
plus residual plot” of CSR and soft information (Larsen and McCleary, 1972).39 It represents
the relationship between CSR and soft information, taking the other independent variables into
account. It shows that most firms are not far from the tendency. However, a small group of
38For Table 8, we only present the results of the last two specifications. The results are similar for the first two
specifications.
39See Figure H for the other two communication variables. This graph is obtained from the specification where
all control variables are included (including sector dummies).
35
firms are clearly above it (highlighted in the circle, approximately). These firms are our “usual
suspects”.
Figure 2: Component Plus Residual Plot of CSR and Soft Information (Number of Pages)
6.3 Who Are the “Usual Suspects”? The Non-Linear Relation Between
Soft Information and CSR
This last set of estimates must be seen as a statistical projection of the previous set of estimates,
without claiming any causal link between the variables. What we will do here is make the CSR
level a dependent variable and soft information an independent variable, together with the other
control variables which we have already used. The goal is not to pretend that the level of soft
information has a causal effect on CSR. Once again, we keep to the sequence proposed by the
theoretical model where CSR is supposed to determine both soft and hard information levels.
The goal is to try to identify the firms that are located in the circle in Graph 2 more precisely. By
introducing the squared term of the soft information variable, we can identify a possible inverted
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U-shape relation between soft information and CSR.
Before presenting the results of the estimate with the squared term, Figure 3 shows the
augmented component plus residual graph representing the relation between the soft information
variable (here , the number of pages in the last report) and the CSR level, controlling for other
independent variables.40 The lowest smooth curve clearly indicates a non-linear relation between
soft information and CSR (see Figure 5 in Annex H for other proxies for soft information).
Figure 3: Component Plus Residual Plot of Soft Information (Number of Pages) and CSR
The specification is the following:
CSR = γ1X + γ2X
2 + γ3CRcheck + γ4Z + γ4Y +  (14)
Where CSR is our index of the general level of CSR, X is the level of soft information proxied
40This graph is obtained after a regression including the CSR level as the dependent variable, and the following
variables as independent variables: the number of pages in the last report, CRcheck, assets (in log), age (in log),
operational revenue (in log), sector dummies and countries dummies.
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by our three measures of sustainable development reporting, X2 its squared term, CRcheck the
level of hard information proxied by externally assured reports, Z a set of control variables, and
Y is the log of operational revenue. The error term  is assumed to be i.i.d.. The results are
given in Table 4.41
Table 4: OLS Estimates of CSR
Dep. Variable CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR CSR
Number of Pages 0.000897*** 0.00229***
(5.507) (7.094)
[Number of Pages]2 -5.33e-06***
(-4.660)
Number of Reports 0.0147*** 0.0306***
(8.988) (6.684)
[Number of Reports]2 -0.000901***
(-3.228)
Number of Reports (per year) 0.0470* 0.138***
(1.948) (7.732)
[Number of Reports (per year)]2 -0.00777***
(-7.271)
CRcheck 0.0733*** 0.0548*** 0.0636*** 0.0450*** 0.0827*** 0.0628***
(4.232) (3.125) (3.919) (2.700) (4.661) (3.718)
Assets (in log) 0.0523*** 0.0494*** 0.0456*** 0.0453*** 0.0498*** 0.0423***
(5.375) (5.453) (5.058) (5.310) (5.064) (4.734)
Age (in log) 0.0131 0.00971 0.0104 0.0102 0.0130 0.0130
(0.946) (0.713) (0.784) (0.791) (0.979) (0.991)
Op. Rev. (in log) 0.00886 0.00670 0.00435 -0.000642 0.0152 0.0114
(0.857) (0.679) (0.439) (-0.0680) (1.479) (1.213)
Constant -0.864*** -0.764*** -0.615*** -0.503*** -0.926*** -0.719***
(-9.466) (-8.356) (-5.337) (-5.593) (-6.918) (-5.737)
Observations 482 482 491 487 491 491
R-squared 0.550 0.578 0.585 0.604 0.544 0.589
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results clearly support the hypothesis of a non-linear relation between CSR and the soft
information level. All estimated coefficients for proxies for soft information take a positive sign,
41Alternative specifications without sector dummies, without CRcheck, and without operational revenue gave
the same results (available upon request).
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while their squared terms are negative. All coefficients are highly significant.
Lind and Mehlum (2007) consider that a significant quadratic term is too weak a criterion to
confirm the existence of an inverted U-shape curve. They propose to check whether the turning
point is in the data interval and to test the slope on the beginning and the ending of the interval.
They also propose to use a test developed by Sasabuchi (1980) which measures the significance
of the inverted-U shape curve. Table 5 presents the result of these tests.42 The Sasabuchi
test confirms the existence of an inverted U-shape for our three communication variables. The
estimated turning point is always included in the interval. The slope of the curve takes the
expected sign in all cases.
Table 5: Test for U-Shaped (Lind and Mehlum, 2007)
Var. Number of pages Number of reports Number of reports
(last report) (per year)
Interval [0,436] [0,29] [0,16]
Slope at lower bound .0022879*** .0306469*** .1381999***
Slope at upper bound -.0023566*** -.021585** -.1103527***
Sasabuchi Test for inverse U-shaped 3.31*** 1.79** 6.31***
Turning Point 214.7743 17.01567 8.896299
95% confidence interval for extreme point [182.47344; 283.88567] [13.153862; 31.954222] [8.3220635; 9.5967395]
(Fieller method)
Note: With ***, ** and * respectively denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels
These results give credit to our theoretical results. Different communication strategies are
possible. This non-linear relation between soft information and CSR tends to show that some
firms actually over-communicate in comparison with their effective level of CSR. This may explain
why the CSR “optimal level” is found to be lower when firms can communicate. Our “usual
suspects” are more likely to have a communication level which is beyond the different estimated
turning points.
As for the proxy for the communication experience (the total number of reports), it can echo
one intuition in the model related to the influence of credibility in CSR. Our model suggests
that a firm will have an incentive to decrease her level of CSR if her level of credibility is high
42We only present the results using all control variables. The results are similar with different specifications.
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enough (Grubb (2011) proves this formally). This increased credibility may be explained by two
effects. The first one is an effect of “CSR efficiency” : past investments in CSR will increase the
efficiency of current investments. The second one, which is not directly suggested by the model
but is relatively obvious here, is a simple effect of reputation.
7 Conclusions
The empirical study of the greenwashing phenomenon is new in economics, while its theoretical
study is very recent. Greenwashing practices have changed during the past few years and this
paper offers a theoretical framework that shows the typical behavior of greenwashing firms which
explains the emergence of the new greenwashing practices highlighted by TerraChoice (2010); we
also provide empirical estimations that validate most of the behavior predicted in the theoretical
part.
First, when firms have internalized their investment in CSR, the possibility of hard green-
washing is not ruled out at all and one can observe massive over-communication. The degree
of complementarity between the consumer and the firm on hard information communication is
important. A firm that is more scrutinized by consumer groups or NGOs is likelier to send hard
information and less likely to greenwash.
Second, ad light greenwashing occurs when firms reduce their optimal level of CSR because
they can advertise for their green products. However, they increase their effort in the communi-
cation of hard information.
Third, the presence of greenwashers may lead a firm that has invested in CSR to reduce her
investment in CSR. We label this constrained light greenwashing.
Hence, if we go back to the TerraChoice terminology, this indicates that the sins of no
proof and of vagueness, in the case of constrained light greenwashing, are complementary, which
explains why they have increased simultaneously. Conversely, these two sins are substitutes in
the case of ad light greenwashing, which explains why the sin of vagueness has grown more
quickly in recent years.
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Empirically, the CSR level affects the probability of sending “hard information” in order to
convince skeptical consumers positively. However, the interaction between CSR and commu-
nication is negative. For a given level of CSR, the probability of sending hard information is
lower when green communication increases. We also find a non-linear relation between CSR and
communication. If there is a general positive trend between CSR and communication, some firms
are clearly outside this trend, suggesting a possible greenwashing behavior. This empirical result
confirms that green communication may reduce the optimal level of CSR for some firms. Hence
we explain and confirm the two sins underlined by TerraChoice.
The greenwashing strategy may indeed represent a serious issue for the development of CSR
practices. Active consumer lobbies can contribute to solving the problem by increasing the
transmission of hard information and by decreasing the cost of sending it for firms. Public
regulations should also help reduce this phenomenon, as it appears that sectors which are under
strong public scrutiny are not tempted by greenwashing. Thus, the decision makers’ trust is as
important as the consumers’. A last important aspect that needs to be underlined is that a good
knowledge of the consumers’ reaction to green advertising should help reduce the greenwashing
behavior.
The theoretical part also shows that dealing with greenwashing is not an easy task. Whether
the aim is to fight greenwashing strategies or to encourage investment in CSR, the recommen-
dations will differ as the constrained light greenwashing case highlights. In a way, greenwashing
can be compatible with relatively high levels of CSR. Yet, in the case of ad light greenwashing,
greenwashing implies a sharp decrease in CSR. Given these elements, a major recommendation
would be to raise the consumers’ awareness of this potential greenwashing problem. A product
bearing more green claims will not necessarily increase the probability of higher satisfaction for
the consumer. We believe that shedding light on the greenwashing behavior and highlighting
how to detect it is the best way to circumvent it.
41
References
Ai, C. and Norton, E. C. 2003. Interaction terms in logit and probit models. Economics Letters,
80(1):123–129. 32
Bagwell, K. 2007. The economic analysis of advertising. In Armstrong, M. and Porter, R.,
editors, Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 3, pages 1701–1844. 29
Baron, D. P. 2001. Private politics, corporate social responsibility and integrated strategy.
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 10(1):7–45. 3
Baron, D. P. 2007. Corporate social responsibility and social entrepreneurship. Journal of
Economics & Management Strategy, 16(3):683–717. 3
Baron, D. P. 2009. The economics and politics of corporate social performance. Stanford Grad-
uate School of Business Research Paper No. 1993R. 3
Bazillier, R. and Vauday, J. 2009. The greenwashing machine: is csr more than communication?
Document de Recherche du LEO, 2009-10. 24, 25
Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J., and Klemperer, P. 1985. Multimarket oligopoly: strategic substitutes
and strategic complements. Journal of Political Economy, 93:488–511. 7
ChristianAid 2004. The real face of corporate social responsibility. Technical report, Christian
Aid, UK. 2
Cochran, P. and Wood, R. 1984. Corporate social responsability and financial performance. The
Academy of Management Journal, 27(1):42–56. 22
Darby, M. R. and Karni, E. 1973. Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud. Journal
of Law and Economics, 16:67–88. 3, 6
Dejean and Oxibar 2003. An alternative approach to evaluate corporate social performance.
Paper Presented at European Accounting Association Congress, April, Sevilla. 23
42
Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. 2005. Modes of communication. Journal of Political Economy,
113(6):1217–1238. 4, 6
Dickson, M. 2001. Utility of no sweat labels for apparel consumers: Profiling label users and
predicting their purchases. The Journal of Consumers Affairs, 35(1):96–119. 8
Figge, F. and Hann, T. 2001. Sustainable value added - measuring corporate contributions to
sustainability. The 2001 Business Strategy and the Environment Conference Proceedings. ERP
Environment: Shipley; 83-92. 22
Gabaix, X. and Laibson, D. 2006. Shrouded attributes, consumer myopa, and information sup-
pression in competitive markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2):505–540. 9
Grubb, M. D. 2011. Developing a reputation for reticence. Journal of Economics & Management
Strategy, 20(1):225–268. 3, 40
Igalens, J. and Gond, J. 2005. Measuring corporate social performance in france: A critical and
empirical analysis of arese data. Journal of Business Ethics, 56(2):131–148. 22, 23, 25
Kaldor, N. 1950. The economic aspects of advertising. Review of Economic Studies, 18:1=27. 29
Korhonen, J. 2003. Should we measure corporate social responsibility? Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility and Environmental Management, 10(1):25–39. 22
Larsen, W. and McCleary, S. 1972. The use of partial residual plots in regression analysis.
Technometrics, 14:781–790. 35
Lind, J. T. and Mehlum, H. 2007. With or without u? - the appropriate test for a u shaped
relationship. MPRA Paper 4823, University Library of Munich, Germany. 39
Lyon, T. P. and Maxwell, J. W. 2010. Greenwash: Corporate environmental disclosure under
threat of audit. Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, Forthcoming:–. 3, 5, 23
43
Mattingly, J. E. and Greening, D. W. 1999. Corporate social performance orientations: An
exploratory investigation of dimensionality and taxonomy underlying the kld company profiles
database. In Windsor, D. and Welcomer, S. A., editors, Proceedings of the Thirteenth annual
Meeting of the International Association for Business and Society, pages 96–99. 22
McWilliams, A. and Siegel, D. 2001. Corporate social responsability and financial performance:
a theory of the firm perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26:112–127. 3
MORI 2000. European attitudes towards corporate social responsibility. Research for CSR
Europe. London: MORI. 8
Moskowitz, M. 1975. Profiles in corporate responsability. Business and Society Review, 13:29–42.
22
Nelson, P. 1970. Information and consumer behavior. Journal of Political Economy, 78:311–329.
2
Nelson, P. 1974. Advertising as information. Journal of political economy, 82:729–754. 2
ORSE 2004. Rapport remis au gouvernement sur le bilan critique de la loi nre. Technical report,
ORSE, Paris, France. 23
Pelsmacker, P., Driesen, L., and Rayp, G. 2001. Corporate performance and stakeholder man-
agement: balancing shareholder and customer interests in the uk privatized water industry.
The Journal of Consumer Affairs, 39(2):363–384. 8
Sasabuchi, S. 1980. A test of a multivariate normal mean with composite hypotheses determined
by linear inequalities. Biometrika, 67:429–39. 39
Siegel, D. and Vitalino, D. 2007. An empirical analysis of the strategic use of corporate social
responsibility. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 16(3):773–792. 3, 22
TerraChoice 2007. The six sins of greenwashing. Technical report, TerraChoice. 5
44
TerraChoice 2010. The sins of greenwashing home and family edition. Technical report, Terra-
Choice. 5, 40
Tsoutsoura, M. 2004. Corporate social responsability and financial performance. University of
California, Berkeley, WP. 22
Ullman, A. 1985. Data in search of a theory: A critical examination of the relationship among
social performance, social disclosure and economic performance of us firms. Academy of Man-
agement Review, 10:540–557. 23
Waddock, S. and Graves, S. 1997. The corporate social performance / financial performance
link. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4):303–319. 22
45
A Proof of Lemma 1
The first two parts of the lemma are trivial. Given the four equations, if a firm can charge a large
ph for a large rh without spending a prohibitive cost for sending cue αmax, (αmax, 0) is preferred
to (α∗, 0) because of the systematic loss the latter induces due to suspicious consumers. A large
rh is announced.
Conversely, (α∗, 0) is preferred to (αmax, 0) for a flat curve ph(rh), a steep curve Fa(.) and a
low δ. A low rh is announced.
(αmax, 0) is preferred to (α˜ > α∗, 0) and (α˜ < α∗, 0) if
p <
Fa(α˜) + F (x
∗)− Fa(αmax) + δph
δph
(15)
which is true if Fa(α˜) + F (x∗)− Fa(αmax) is positive, hence for a low Fa(αmax). A large rh does
not a priori increase the preference for (αmax, 0).
(α∗, 0) is preferred to (α˜ > α∗, 0) and (α˜ < α∗, 0) if
p <




which is more likely for a low δ and a low ph. Announcing a low rh a priori increases the preference
for (α∗, 0), because cost functions are convex.
Between these two extreme solutions, the firm plays either (α˜ > α∗, 0) or (α˜ < α∗, 0) according
to its maximization program. The second strategy is less costly, but it also reduces the probability
of selling the product. Moreover, the first strategy allows to sell the product for sure if the
consumer is gullible, although it induces a waste (the HI has been sent for nothing). All in all,
it depends on the cost functions.
A necessary condition for these two strategies to be preferred is to have Fa(α˜) + F (x∗) <
Fa(α
max).
As for the second part of the lemma, we know that the firm will announce a moderate rh.
46
The maximization program is such that announcing a too high rh would induce a too costly
communication (of both types). Moreover, since she sends HI, the firm necessarily sends her true
level rh. This forces firms that would choose to send (αmax, 0) to moderate their announced rh.
Otherwise, a too high rh would signal their type.
The third part of the lemma is also trivial. If the CSR-firm prefers (αmax, 0), then the GW-
firm also does. If two products with the same rh and αmax are sold, then they both have one
chance out of two to be bought. The same is true if the CSR-firm prefers (α∗, 0), i.e. they both
send (α∗, 0) and have 1/2 chance to sell the product.
B Proof of Result 1: the CSR-Firm Sends α∗ or αmax
Proof.
B.1 Suppose First the CSR-Firm Prefers (α∗, 0)
Either the GW-firm prefers (α∗, 0) (i), or (αmax, 0) (ii). pCSRs (pGWs ) denotes the probability the
CSR-firm (GW-firm) will sell her product.
B.1.1 The Consumer Is Gullible
If (i), then pCSRs = 0 and pGWs = 1 and if (ii) pCSRs = pGWs = 1/2
B.1.2 The Consumer Is Not Gullible
If (i), then 1− pCSRs = pGWs = 1 and if (ii) pCSRs = 0 = pGWs
B.2 The CSR-Firm Prefers (αmax, 0)
B.2.1 The Consumer Is Gullible
If (i), then pCSRs = pGWs = 1/2 and if (ii) pCSRs = 1 = 1− pGWs
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B.2.2 The Consumer Is Not Gullible
If (i), then pCSRs = pGWs = 1/2 and if (ii) pCSRs = 1 = 1− pGWs
B.3 The Result
Hence, as for the probability of selling the product, (αmax, 0) strictly dominates (α∗, 0). As a
consequence, if the cue cost function is not too convex and if the price function is not too concave,
the dominant strategy for the CSR-firm is to play (αmax, 0). The best response to this strategy
for the GW-firm is also to play (αmax, 0). In fine, they both have a probability 1/2 of selling the
product.
C Proof of Proposition 1
Proof.
C.1 Situation (i)
The GW-firm has sent α˜ = α∗. We assume that a gullible consumer always chooses the high-ad
product. As a consequence, with pis for i = GW,CSR the probability of selling the product,
then pCSRs = 1 = 1− pGWs if she has sent α˜ > α∗ and pCSRs = 0 = 1− pGWs if she has sent α˜ < α∗.
C.2 Situation (ii)
The GW-firm has sent αmax, hence pCSRs = 0 whatever α˜.
C.3 Situation (iii)
The GW-firm has sent (α˜ = α∗, 0). For the sake of simplicity, we assume that both products
have the same announced rh. Another way to put it is to say that for any level rh a CSR-firm
may announce, there exists a GW-firm that has announced the same level.
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It should be noted that it is not in the interest of the GW-firm to try to mimic the cue
communication strategy of the CSR-firm. If the consumer is gullible, the probability that he will
buy the product, according to our assumption, depends on the two cues sent by both firms. The
GW-firm has no clue about the real level of α˜. Intuitively, the GW-firm could even send αmax, but
it would be a waste given her prior about the type of consumer she is facing. Moreover, the price
would not change and the GW-firm is not able to determine whether the CSR-firm has sent αmax
or less.43 Hence she will not be compensated for the large increase in the communication cost, so
she sticks to her first-best strategy. If the consumer is not gullible, then sending less than αmax
makes no sense since the consumer would, by assumption, look for HI, so the GW-firm would
have no chance to sell her product. As a consequence, if the GW-firm thinks the consumer is not
gullible, she has no interest in mimicking the CSR-firm. If she thinks the consumer is gullible,
the same argument as above holds since in such a case she is certain that she will not sell her
product if in the end the consumer is not gullible.
We now turn to the two subcases.
C.3.1 The No-GW Firm Has Sent (α˜ > α∗, x∗)
The suspicious consumer has to choose whether to look at the product with a low cue or the
one with a high cue. He knows that both products, if they contain CSR, offer the same level rh.
Given the convex shape of C(y) and the fact that a higher α leads him to make a greater effort
to assimilate the HI, the increased cost implied is not compensated by the increased probability
of assimilating the HI, and then he chooses to look for HI for the product with the lowest cue.
Consequently, pCSRs = pGWs = 0.
C.3.2 The No-GW Firm Has Sent (α˜ < α∗, x∗)
The consumer turns to the product with the lowest cue and so pCSRs = p and pGWs = 0.
43Since the GW-firm does not know the cost structure of the CSR-firm, she cannot infer from a relatively low
announced rh that the strategy of the CSR-firm is to send (α˜, x∗).
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C.4 Situation (iv)
C.4.1 The No-GW Firm Has Sent (α˜ > α∗, x∗)
In this case, the suspicious consumer chooses the product with the signal αmax as it is less costly
(he has no effort to make). Thus, we have pCSRs = 0 and pGWs = 1.
C.4.2 The No-GW Firm Has Sent (α˜ < α∗, x∗)
As above, the αmax-product implies a smaller effort for the consumer. However, a new effect is
at play : he also knows that the other product, if he was to decide to seek HI concerning it, is
for sure a CSR-product. Hence, contrary to the previous situation, the suspicious consumer has
additional information. He chooses to consider the α˜-product. Indeed, the consumer has no idea
about the number of GW-firms and No-GW firms on the market, but he surely knows that there
is one No-GW firm.44 Hence, pCSRs = p and pGWs = 0.
C.5 The Result
Lemma 1 states that (αmax, 0) may be a dominant strategy if Fa(.) is not too convex and if ph(.)
is not too concave.
If this is not the case, there is no dominant strategy for the CSR-firm when taking into account
the possible strategies of the GW-firm. As a consequence, she plays her first-best strategy (α˜, x∗)
where α˜ could either be superior or inferior to α∗. Considering that C(.) is such that C prefers
seeking HI for the low-ad product does not change anything to this result.
As for the GW-firm, (αmax, 0) weakly dominates (α∗, 0) when looking at the probability of
selling the GW-product. However, since (αmax, 0) is a more costly strategy, it is not true that
the GW-firm is indifferent to having pGWs = 1 which results from sending αmax or αx. Thus, the
GW-firm also plays its first-best strategy.
44That is, he is not able to determine a probability that the αmax-product hides a GW-firm.
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D Proof of Proposition 2
First of all, we know that if rh decreases, this decreases α˜ and x∗. However, it decreases or
increases α∗. From the proof of lemma 1, we know that although one adds a negative term to
the numerator of the RHS in the inequalities of the proof, there are no reasons to believe that
the ((˜α) > α∗, x∗) or ((˜α) < α∗, x∗) strategy is never preferred.
If a firm prefers ((˜α) > α∗, x∗) but knows that this strategy is too risky, she may either change
to ((˜α) < α∗, x∗), to (αmax, 0) or to (α∗, 0). This implies that the following inequalities were true:
p >
Fa(α˜) + F (x




Fa(α˜) + F (x
∗)− Fa(α∗) + FCSR(rh)
δph
(18)
And the maximization program was such that α˜ > α∗.
We know that a firm that would otherwise choose ((˜α) > α∗, x∗) will decrease the rh to reach
(˜α) < α∗. If the standard maximization program of Uf with respect to rh yields an equilibrium
solution ((˜α) > α∗, x∗), then the same maximization program under the constraint (˜α) < α∗ will
result in a lower r∗h since the constraint is binding.
We now need to know to what proportion the new equilibrium α˜ is lower. This depends on
the relative speeds of increase of α∗ and of decrease of α˜. If the speed of increase of the former
is larger than the speed of decrease of the latter, then we will have a higher α˜, and the opposite
otherwise.
The speed of increase of α∗ is its derivative with respect to rh. We do not have the derivative
of α˜ with respect to rh. However, we know that it is more likely to decrease quickly when ∂ph/∂rh
is large and when ∂y′/∂α is small (otherwise the crowding effect of the cue on the expected HI
effort by the consumer would temperate the incentive of the firm to decrease the cue).
If ∂α∗/∂rh < 0 which implies that ∂ph/∂rh ∗ rh < ph, reducing rh will allow to reach a new
equilibrium such that the new α˜ is close to the previous one and with an α∗ now higher than
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previously. On the contrary, if ∂α∗/∂rh > 0, then both α˜ and α∗ decrease and α˜ is much lower
than previously.
A consequence of the decrease in rh is the reduction of the CSR cost and of the cue cost.
Although the overall resulting equilibrium is not a first-best anymore, these cost decreases may
allow the firm to spend more on HI communication. More specifically, in the case of a large
decrease in α˜, as the firm knows that this will result in a smaller effort by the consumer, she has
an incentive to raise x∗ compared to the first-best equilibrium.







where λ > 0 is the
Lagrange multiplier. Depending on the sign of the difference of the derivatives, this will reduce
or decrease the negative effect in the maximization program. ∂α˜
∂rh
> 0, the sign of the other term




means that the negative effect is greater in the maximization program, everything else being
equal. Thus, we might expect a decrease in x∗ concomitant to the decrease in rh.
If ∂ph/∂rh ∗ rh > ph, then ∂α∗∂rh > 0. Around intermediate values of rh, this might well be
the case (for more extreme values, either rh or ∂ph/∂rh is close to zero). Hence we may have a
reduced negative effect in the maximization program and hence an increase in x∗.
To conclude, if ∂α∗
∂rh
< 0, then α˜ is not much decreasing, especially if ∂y′/∂α is large and if
∂ph/∂rh is small. Moreover, x∗ is very likely to also decrease in this situation. However, the
decrease in rh is moderate.
To the contrary, ∂α∗
∂rh
> 0 which is coherent with the fact that ∂α∗
∂rh
> 0, hence ∂ph/∂rh rather
large, then α˜ decreases sharply and x∗ may increase if ∂y′/∂α is small. But the decrease in rh is
rather important.
E Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. We start with the following lemma that states that under No-Cue, an increase of rH has
two opposed effects but that the overall effect is positive:
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so the positive effect is decreasing in rH .
Then, let us consider first what happens if a firm announces r¯H when no cue can be sent. In
this case, she spends a cost FCSR(r¯H). In parallel, an increase in rH increases the consumer’s
communication effort and an increase in FCSR(r¯H) reduces the communication effort by the firm.
Now, let us consider a firm that announces r¯H < r¯H . As seen above, the cost in investing
in CSR is lower, so the effort the firm will make will be greater for hard information. She will
however send a cue. A lower rH means a higher α∗. The effect on the consumer’s effort when
switching from r¯H to r¯H generates a positive but small effect based on the lemma above.
As a consequence, the firm that can use a cue saves FCSR(r¯H)−FCSR(r¯H). She spends Fa(α)
more. The effect on both efforts is ambiguous. Switching from r¯H to r¯H implies that the effort by
the firm is greater because of a greater reward and that the consumer’s effort is smaller because
of a smaller reward. Then, the difference between the two probabilities ultimately depends on
the elasticity of investing in CSR. The higher it is, the higher the probability under r¯H .
Therefore, if the cost of sending a cue is not too high, the firm choosing r¯H may achieve the
same utility under cue as a firm choosing r¯H under No-Cue. However, she makes an effort in
hard information communication.
F Probit Estimates of Hard Information
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Table 6: Probit Estimates of Hard Information (Externally Assured) with Number of Reports
Dependent variable Crcheck Crcheck Crcheck Crcheck
CSR 2.581*** 2.887*** 2.357** 2.502
(4.320) (4.746) (2.061) (1.629)
Number of reports 0.136*** 0.111** 0.968*** 0.958
(2.759) (2.261) (3.874) (1.607)
Number of reports x CSR -0.122 -0.138* -1.076*** -1.062*
(-1.491) (-1.720) (-3.297) (-1.763)
Assets (in log) 0.0745* 0.301*** 0.0960 0.150
(1.699) (3.800) (1.388) (0.743)
Age (in log) -0.0371 -0.0534 -0.0822 -0.0909
(-0.373) (-0.509) (-0.516) (-0.526)
Constant -3.186*** -7.194*** -4.613*** -6.038**
(-3.790) (-5.183) (-3.097) (-2.035)
Country-specific fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Instrumental Variables NO NO YES YES
Observations 498 488 492 483
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.25
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Probit estimates with endogenous regressors use Newey’s minimum chi-squared estimator
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Table 7: Probit Estimates of Hard Information (Externally Assured) With Number of Reports
Per Year
Dependent variable Crcheck Crcheck Crcheck Crcheck
CSR 3.931*** 3.716*** 0.800 -1.864
(5.027) (5.293) (0.340) (-0.182)
Number of Reports (per year) 1.410*** 1.185*** 5.767*** 8.551
(3.588) (3.244) (3.081) (0.860)
Number of Reports (per year) x CSR -1.944*** -1.745*** -4.466* -5.543
(-2.787) (-2.944) (-1.684) (-1.096)
Assets (in log) 0.0849* 0.308*** 0.0456 -0.0541
(1.911) (4.072) (0.471) (-0.0839)
Age (in log) -0.0456 -0.0717 -0.0296 -0.127
(-0.454) (-0.696) (-0.137) (-0.354)
Constant -3.939*** -7.778*** -4.190** -3.723
(-4.389) (-5.872) (-2.083) (-0.430)
Country-specific fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Instrumental Variables NO NO YES YES
Observations 498 488 492 483
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.32
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Probit estimates with endogenous regressors use Newey’s minimum chi-squared estimator
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G OLS Estimates of Soft Information
Table 8: OLS Estimates of Soft Information (Reports and Reports Per Year)
Dep. Variable Number of reports Number of Reports Reports per year Reports per year
CSR 10.65*** 10.02*** 1.370*** 1.379***
(9.360) (8.695) (7.381) (6.797)
CRcheck 1.392*** 1.047** 0.113 0.0854
(2.926) (2.181) (1.563) (1.155)
Assets (in log) -0.392*** 0.0793 -0.0245 0.0321
(-3.079) (0.341) (-1.413) (0.912)
Age (in log) 0.0123 0.0811 -0.0291 -0.00732
(0.0506) (0.338) (-0.655) (-0.141)
Op. Rev. (in log) 1.160*** 0.789*** 0.110*** 0.0497
(7.149) (3.360) (3.611) (1.246)
Constant -8.790*** -20.80*** -0.987*** -1.814***
(-4.128) (-5.445) (-2.731) (-2.978)
Observations 493 491 493 491
R-squared 0.452 0.487 0.248 0.270
Country-specific fixed effects YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects NO YES NO YES
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
H Component Plus Residual Plot of CSR and Soft Infor-
mation
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Figure 4: Component Plus Residual Plot of CSR and Soft Information
(1) Number of Reports and (2) Reports Per Year
Figure 5: Component Plus Residual Plot of Soft Information and CSR
(1) Number of Reports and (2) Reports Per Year
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